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Post: Voting Early and Often 
 
VOTING EARLY AND OFTEN CAN BE A GOOD THING 
Gerald V. Post, University of the Pacific, JPost@Pacific.edu 
 
Abstract 
The current political climate has almost ruled out the use of Internet voting. Many politicians, led by vocal 
computer scientists, are pushing for voter verified paper receipts; which is likely to push us even further 
away from even electronic voting systems. On the other hand, cryptographers have created homomorphic 
encryption and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs with features that can support Internet voting. 
Adding a few more protocols, including an extended voting period and repeat voting can solve the 
remaining problems need to make Internet voting at least as secure as existing systems. 
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Introduction and Prior Research 
 
The voting problems experienced in the 2000 presidential election occurred around the same time as the initial growth of 
the Web, so several groups suggested that Internet voting could be used for major elections. Some organizations tested the 
process. Mohen and Glidden (2001) report on the Arizona Republican primary in 2000; Xenakis and Macintosh (2004) 
discuss the pilot testing performed in the United Kingdom in 2003. In 2000, the U.S. DoD ran an Internet demonstration 
project in 11 countries according to Garamone (2004). Accenture, in cooperation with the DoD built a system for the Secure 
Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE) with the purpose of helping overseas military personnel vote in 
elections. The system was put on hold in 2004.  
In a relatively short period of time, the tide was turned against Internet voting by several outspoken computer scientists. 
For example, Jefferson et al. (2004) were on a panel that recommended the immediate termination of the SERVE project. 
Several other groups, including the California Internet Voting Task Force (2000) have argued against Internet voting. The 
National Workshop on Internet Voting funded by the NSF essentially concluded that the Internet lacked the security to 
support voting. Major computing organizations, particularly the Association of Computing Machinery (2004) have strongly 
recommended against the use of Internet voting, and have even expressly stated that all voting should include some type of 
physical (paper) record to be inspected by the voter. 
The attacks against online voting quickly spread to direct recording electronic (DRE) systems, or computer-based voting 
systems installed in traditional voting booths. Feldman et al. (2006) and Felten (2006) reported on their dissection of a dated 
voting machine, and reached the conclusion that voting can be secure only with a voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VPAT). 
Mercuri (2001) and Mercuri and Camp (2004) has been pushing this point for several years. It is interesting to note that 
problems were reported (ZDNet 2006) with printers jamming in the 2006 election, including an AP estimate that 9 percent of 
printers either failed or had paper problems. 
These issues have moved the discussion away from the original goals. One of the original reasons for Internet voting was 
to make it easier for people to vote—hopefully improving voter turnout. One study by Stromer-Galley (2003) revealed 
comments from participants in a large discussion group. Several suggested that the Internet would make it easier to vote, 
increasingly the likelihood that they would participate. Of course, there is no assurance that making it easier or more 
comfortable to vote would actually result in an increase in the number of voters—given the many reasons that people have 
for not voting. Williams and King (2004) emphasize the usability issue in their study of the DRE voting-booth data provided 
by elections in Georgia. The electronic systems provided fewer usability errors, and were substantially preferred by the 
voters. Earlier, Shocket et al. (1991) showed similar results in an experimental design with various ballot technologies. 
The goal of this paper is to re-examine the Internet voting approach by looking at the various threats and goals and 
proposing a method to improve the overall security. This process is shown to be at least as secure as existing system, and 
more secure than postal absentee ballots, which Phillips and Spakovsky (2001) observe are becoming more prevalent and 
present a major attack point. 
 
The Election Process 
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Figure 1. Basic voting process. 
 
The current election process shown in Figure 1 has evolved over decades. Local election officials are responsible for 
validating the candidates and registering voters. The separation between voter authentication and the vote is important to 
ensure anonymity of the vote and it is enforced through physical separation. The separate count of the voters provides a check 
to reduce the probability of ballot stuffing or discarding of ballots. This count can also be compared against the original 
number of ballots to reduce the risk of vote replacement. In traditional systems, the vote is encoded on paper (usually punch 
card or optical scan form); providing the means to conduct both electronic and manual counting. In physical systems, voting 
places are staffed by members of both major parties—with the goal of reducing the probability that election officials are 
corrupt.  
 
Primary Criteria and Threats 
 
1. Eligibility and Authentication—only authorized voters should be able to vote. 
2. Uniqueness—no voter should be able to cast a vote more than one time. 
3. Accuracy—election systems should record the votes correctly. 
4. Integrity—votes should not be able to be modified, forged, or deleted without detection. 
5. Verifiability and Auditability—it should be possible to verify that all votes have been correctly accounted for in the 
final election tally, and there should be reliable and demonstrably authentic election records. 
6. Reliability—election systems should work robustly, without loss of any votes, even in the face of numerous failures, 
including failures of voting machines and total loss of communication. 
7. Secrecy and Non-Coercibility—no one should be able to determine how any individual voted, and voters should not be 
able to prove how they voted. 
8. Flexibility—election equipment should allow for a variety of ballot question formats (e.g., write-in candidates, survey 
questions, multiple languages); be compatible with a variety of standard platforms and technologies; and be accessible 
to people with disabilities. 
9. Convenience—voters should be able to cast votes quickly with minimal equipment or skills. 
10. Certifiability—election systems should be testable so that election officials have confidence that they meet the 
necessary criteria. 
11. Transparency—voters should be able to possess a general knowledge and understanding of the voting process. 
12. Cost-effectiveness—election systems should be affordable and efficient. 
Figure 2: Election technology criteria. Source: Internet Policy Institute (2001). 
 
The NSF-sponsored national workshop Internet Policy Institute (2001) identified the 12 criteria shown in Figure 2 as 
important elements in any election system. Most of these threats have been manifested as attacks at various elections in U.S. 
history. The current voting-booth solution reduces the risks of all of these threats, but does not eliminate them. Ultimately, 
most of the security of the existing system depends on the processes and integrity of the local election officials. For example, 
an official could delay adding a voter to a registration list; preventing (or at least making it more difficult for) a legitimate 
voter to vote. Similarly, marks indicating a double vote could be added to a legitimate ballot (for the “other” party), causing it 
to become disqualified. Recording the name of a voter and counting the number of ballots makes it relatively difficult to add 
unregistered votes at any one location. However, the registration rolls are difficult to keep up to date and can contain names 
3of people who are no longer legitimate voters. The process is complicated by allowing people to vote at multiple locations, 
including absentee ballots. The system is probably strongest at protecting ballot secrecy. But, determined poll workers could 
employ several means to identify the votes of at least some of the voters (e.g., ballot isolation).  
Ballot secrecy is an interesting aspect of the system. In many ways, it is the distinguishing feature that makes the process 
difficult to automate. It is also interesting because in many ways it represents a distinction between a personal issue and a 
societal issue. A voter can benefit by selling a vote and might not care which candidate is elected. But society faces a huge 
risk if votes can be sold easily. The important aspect of the manual system is that it does not actually prevent vote selling or 
coercion. In theory, a candidate could offer money to a voter, and the voter might actually accept the money and cast the 
corresponding vote. However, the secrecy of the result prevents the vote buyer from determining the true vote. Note that 
absentee (postal) ballots have been criticized by several people because the secrecy is more easily compromised (both by the 
individual and by the local election officials). 
 
Cryptographic Tools 
 
Several cryptographic tools have been created to protect transactions. The most common method is dual-key encryption 
or public-key infrastructure (PKI). This technology is built into Web browsers and used in many situations. It has been in use 
for many years and proven effective. It has two strengths: (1) It protects any message from interception or modification 
between the point of encryption and decryption, and (2) It authenticates the computer server (key issuer) to the client 
computer (browser).  
Another powerful cryptographic tool is homomorphic encryption. Cohen and Fischer (1985) explained how it can be 
used to obscure individual votes without compromising the overall total. Benaloh and Yung (1986) developed a similar 
process and other researchers have expanded the ideas and methods. The most important feature of homomorphic encryption 
is that: 
Decryptsk[Encryptpk(v1) *…* Encryptpk(vn)] = v1 + … + vn
Each vote (vi) is encrypted with a public key and stored on a central server. The trick is that the individual votes are not 
decrypted. Instead, the encrypted values are multiplied together and the result is decrypted. This result contains the same 
value as the original sum of the raw votes. Adida and Rivest (2006) point out that the Paillier (1999) encryption methodology 
is particularly effective and it adds a random element to every encryption so that no one can observe the final vote. The 
encrypted votes can be further protected by using a key-generation system that shares the secret key among several officials.  
Homomorphic encryption does add an important risk. If one voter submits an invalidly encrypted vote, multiplying this 
bad value into the others will destroy the vote. Consequently, another cryptographic tool was introduced, e.g., by Benaloh 
and Yung (1986). The non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) solves the problem because each voter provides a 
mathematical proof that the data was encrypted correctly and that the result contains only one vote per contest. The zero 
knowledge aspect of the proof is that the accuracy is shown without revealing the specific vote. For example, Neff (2001) 
presents a shuffling technique to verify the overall ballot without revealing the individual choices. The non-interactive part of 
the name stems from the fact that a Fiat and Shamir (1987) heuristic is applied during the process using a shared random 
string instead of asking for a response from the user (voter). Details were first defined by Blum et al. (1988). 
Adida and Rivest (2006) present one of the more complete and interesting uses of these technologies. The primary goal 
of the approach is the ability to provide an anonymous receipt to the voter. The voter would later be able to verify that the 
vote posted online matches the receipt—without revealing the actual candidates because of the randomization. With these 
tools, votes can be submitted securely, counted without revealing the original vote, and provide a means for voters to verify 
their votes were submitted correctly. Figure 3 shows a sample ballot, where the voter sees the candidate list, but only the 
matching encrypted value is submitted to the vote-counting server. Each value includes a random element and is submitted 
with an NIZK proof of correctness. 
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Figure 3: Ballot with encrypted values 
 
Another Proposal for an Internet-Based Voting System 
 
4Although cryptography solves many of the big problems, the critics are correct. Substantial risks remain within the 
existing proposals. However, it is possible to overcome these risks without too much additional effort. But, the solution does 
require a couple of twists that are detailed in this section. 
Allowing people to vote from personal computers that are potentially insecure causes three serious issues. (1) A voter’s 
computer could contain sophisticated malware that effectively intercepts the communication between the user and the voting 
system. This software could cause problems in two ways: (a) It could immediately alter the person’s vote and hide the actions 
from the voter. (b) It could capture the voter’s credentials and forward them to a third party. (2) Another major challenge is 
that attackers could mount a denial of service (DOS) attack against the government election servers—preventing people from 
voting at all. (3) The issue of ballot secrecy is also more challenging when users no longer vote in a public location. In 
particular, several writers have suggested that coercion (and vote buying) would become possible with an Internet-based (or 
postal-based) system. All of these criticisms are valid with the systems that have been proposed to date.  
 
Proposed Protocol 
 
The proposed process outlined here is shown in Figure 4 and explained in more detail in the following subsections. 
(1) Voters register—possibly manually using existing methods. 
(2) Election officials set up a Web site, probably with servers in multiple locations. 
(3) Election officials generate public/private keys and publish the public key certificate. 
(4) Election officials certify candidates. 
(5) Near the election time, the system generates credentials for voters and sends them separately via secondary 
channels (e.g., postal mail). 
(6) The election server generates ballots, with random ordering and an encoded order, similar to the Scratch and 
Vote protocol, but the ballots are electronic. 
(7) Voter randomly chooses or is randomly assigned a ballot, and selects the desired candidates. Only the pre-
encrypted vote selection is sent to the election server, not the candidate names. The submitted encrypted votes 
are validated but not revealed via the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.  
(8) The election process runs for several days, and voters can cast new votes—with only the latest votes being 
counted. The ending time period would be specified in general, but the exact time would be random, and could 
be extended in the event of major failures or attacks. 
(9) Election officials combine their secret keys and decrypt the vote total, but not the individual votes.  
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Figure 4. Internet voting process. 
 
The Coercion Problem 
 
The issue in coercion is to prevent the coercer from verifying the actual vote cast. With a relatively long voting period 
and the ability to recast a vote, the coercer cannot learn the final vote cast. If a coercer paid for a vote and watched the voter 
cast it, the voter could simply vote again and replace the vote. If a voter sells his or her credentials, the buyer has no way of 
guaranteeing that the purchased vote will be the final vote cast. The random ending time prevents someone from waiting until 
the last possible second to cast thousands of collected votes.  
5However, as pointed out by Kiayias and Yung (2002), all voting systems exhibit some tradeoffs. In particular, “perfect” 
ballot secrecy is generally sacrificed. In this case, it is not possible to guarantee that the government-run servers provide 
perfect secrecy. For example, corrupt officials or programmers could use IP addresses to match distributed ballots to votes 
cast. The risk can be minimized, but it cannot be eliminated. However, that same problem arises with the existing voting 
protocols. With the Internet system, the voter authentication is separated from the individual ballot—similar to the way voters 
currently are authenticated separately from the cast vote in today’s systems. The voter retrieves a random ballot from one 
server, authenticates to a second server where only the encrypted vote is cast.  
 
The Denial of Service Problem 
 
Spreading the voting period across a longer time frame also solves the denial of service problem. Using multiple servers 
in multiple locations also reduces the problem. It would be extraordinarily difficult for an attacker to shut down thousands of 
servers in different locations for multiple days. Such an attack would cripple the entire Internet—which would give 
authorities the opportunity to extend the election until the attacks have been reduced to manageable levels. 
The problem is slightly trickier if an attacker goes after a limited number of locations. For example, certain U.S. 
precincts are well-known for voting in specific patterns—largely by political party. An attack on targeted locations might be 
enough to alter some election results. But, because the election is originally scheduled to run over several days (or even 
weeks), it would be difficult for attackers to maintain an attack for the entire time. An attack might concentrate on the 
predicted end of the voting, but election officials could always extend the voting time. Voters should be encouraged to vote 
early to reduce this risk.  
 
The Spyware or Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
 
One of the most common criticisms voiced against Internet voting is the potential for spyware or Trojan Horse programs 
to infect voter’s computers. These programs could do almost anything—alter a vote and hide the changes from the voter, 
delete or not submit a vote, or send voter credentials to an attacker. Society cannot guarantee that an individual has a clean 
computer so critics have condemned Internet voting. However, perhaps the problem is not as large as it appears, and perhaps 
it is not society’s problem. Voters would not be forced to use Internet voting, it would simply be an alternative. Voters who 
are more competent and willing to trust their computers would be more likely to use the Internet to vote. Additionally, 
individuals have incentives to keep their machines clean, because they run a far greater risk of losing money. The loss of 
money is of substantially higher value to the individual than the loss of a vote, so individuals have an incentive to protect and 
clean their own computers. 
In addition, the proposed system presents another way to minimize potential damage from a spyware attack. Voters can 
vote multiple times and they can vote on different computers. If they suspect that a computer is infected, they can use another 
computer in a different location. Using the homomorphic approach, the server can display the voter’s prior selections. 
Although these choices are not associated with the candidate list, the voter can verify that at least the positional data was 
transmitted correctly. An insecure voter could even print out the original ballot choices and compare them to the stored 
values using a second computer from a different location. Even if the second computer is infected, it would not be able to 
alter the display from the server in exactly the same manner as the original computer, so the user would be able to spot a 
problem and revote. 
 
Comparison to Existing Systems 
 
No voting system can be guaranteed correct—not even the existing system. Ultimately, the choice of voting system 
should be up to the voters. If some voters prefer one method and it is not prohibitively expensive to provide it, the informed 
voters are the ones who should make the final decision.  
The proposed Internet system meets or surpasses existing systems. (1) Eligibility and authentication are similar to 
existing methods. The public voting booth approach uses humans to validate voter credentials, but it is not clear that average 
humans are good at this task. Stealing voter credentials would not be a very effective threat, because voters can monitor their 
own votes. If a voter sees that a vote was changed, new credentials could be issued. An attacker might consider waiting until 
the last possible minute and flooding the election servers with votes from thousands of stolen credentials. But, with a random 
ending point, the attacker does not know when to issue the changes. And such an attack would be relatively easy to track. 
Today, millions of people use similar credentials to handle billions of dollars of transactions. Any rational attacker would go 
after the money instead of the votes. 
The bigger problem with authentication is that voters are likely to lose their credentials. The support costs in issuing new 
credentials could be relatively large at the start. However, as long as traditional voting booths remain in parallel use, voters 
could always use those, or be charged a fee to replace lost credentials. 
6(2) Although voters can vote many times, only the last vote will be counted. Once voters are authenticated, the computer 
system can do a better job than people at maintaining unique records. 
(3) Encrypting the votes and verifying the encryption via NIZK proofs helps ensure that votes are recorded correctly. 
The primary risks to the accuracy are forged ballots or votes altered by spyware in a voter’s computer. Ballot forgery can be 
minimized through encryption or even NIZK proofs. The spyware problem is reduced by letting users see their final votes (in 
terms of position and encrypted code). By checking the vote on different computers, the voter can verify the accuracy. 
(4) Because the votes are encrypted, they cannot be altered. The only way they can be replaced is via an authenticated 
user, or an attack on the server. Once again, by enabling voters to verify their votes, this risk is substantially lower with the 
proposed system than with the existing system. 
(5) The final total is automatically verified through the homomorphic encryption process. Similar to the Adida and 
Rivest (2006) process, the counting is essentially a public process. Anyone can compute the encrypted vote total based on the 
public data. Only the election officials can decrypt the final count, but they could publish a NIZK proof of the correctness. 
False reporting could only happen if all of the officials are corrupt. A constraint that is far higher than in the existing systems. 
(6) Robustness is improved by spreading the election over a period of time and across multiple servers. Existing 
transaction-processing technology with redundancy and backup is easily sufficient to handle an election. Individuals can 
always switch to a different client computer in a different location. Widespread loss of electrical power over a major 
geographical area for an extended period of time could prevent voters from casting a vote. However, election officials could 
extend the voting time. 
(7) Secrecy is not perfect, but it is relatively strong—at least as strong as with the existing system. In both systems, users 
could sell votes, but there is no way to prove the final vote, so no candidate or group would spend the money or time. There 
is a potential risk with the proposed system that the government-run servers could track individual voter choices. However, 
this risk can be minimized through audits and encouraging election officials to report fraud.  
(8) Flexibility is far easier to achieve with electronic systems than with the existing systems. By using standard Web 
browser protocols, most system would be compatible and existing adaptive technologies could be used by voters. 
(9) Voting would be more convenient for many people using the Internet. But, the choice would be up to the voter, so 
offering Internet voting as an option enables the voter to decide which method is most convenient. 
(10) The systems are relatively easy to test and every single vote is validated for encryption accuracy. The servers would 
need to be tested rigorously, but those procedures are well-defined. 
(11) Voters would understand the basic process, but it would be difficult to explain the homomorphic encryption 
principles. Expert cryptographers could inform the public that the methods securely protect and hide the individual votes. 
Some people will never believe it, but they can always vote through other methods. The actual voting process would be 
similar to any other voting method.  
(12) Cost is difficult to predict. Building the server software and infrastructure would take money and time. However, 
the technologies are relatively well-known and easy to create. Ultimately, individual precincts would reduce their 
expenditures on personnel and voting booths. But, the system would likely require federal funding and testing. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Internet voting can be as secure and robust as the existing voting methodologies. In fact, with voter verifiable results and 
encrypted votes, it can be more secure. The process is more secure than postal absentee ballots. Considerable work has been 
performed by the cryptographic community to provide tools that make Internet voting possible. Spreading the voting process 
over multiple days and allowing voters to change their votes (vote early and often) solves many of the remaining issues. In 
particular, the commonly-cited threats from coercion/vote buying, denial of service, and spyware are virtually eliminated.   
One of the important strengths of Internet voting is that it makes it easy to correct problems that arise. With paper 
ballots, if the user (or the election authorities) spot a problem, it is almost impossible to fix. For instance, if a voter claims a 
difference between a receipt and a ballot stored on the election server, how would that claim be investigated? Could a vote be 
changed after the election? Using Internet voting over a longer time period, the voter can easily revote if he or she believes a 
problem exists. 
Some critics have pointed out that not all voters have equal access to computers and the Internet; which might skew 
election results, making it easier for wealthier people to vote. It is likely that a greater percentage of wealthier people own 
computers with Internet access. Any conclusions made from that statement remain conjecture at this point. Almost everyone 
does have access to the Internet through some means. Additionally, everyone could still vote through other processes, 
including absentee ballots. It is not clear that adding Internet voting as a new channel is de facto discriminatory. And, there is 
probably no way to prove or reject the hypothesis short of actual elections.  
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